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ABSTRACT 
For Microsoft Windows Operating Systems, both anti-virus products and kernel rootkits often hook 
the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT). This research paper investigates the interaction between 
these two in terms of the SSDT. To investigate these matters, we extracted digital evidence from 
volatile memory, and studied that evidence using the Volatility framework. Due to the diversity in 
detection techniques used by the anti-virus products, and the diversity of infection techniques used by 
rootkits, our investigation produced diverse results, results that helped us to understand several SSDT 
hooking strategies, and the interaction between the selected anti-virus products and the rootkit 
samples. 
Keywords: System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT), Anti-virus, Rootkits, Memory Analysis, 
Volatility 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
SSDT hooking is a prevalent method employed by some security tools, in order to set restrictions on 
accessing a system's resources [12]. For example, anti-virus products often hook the SSDT in order to 
scan the newly launched program [6][7]. Anti-virus products usually achieve this hooking by altering 
addresses stored in the Native SSDT functions, causing them to point to the anti-virus' routines.  The 
anti-virus software then checks and verifies the system call source, blocking all suspicious calls, but 
otherwise invokes the SSDT functions without any changes to the system call [15]. Rootkits usually 
do something similar.  In either case, knowing the table address of the SSDT is required in order to 
index the target functions, and to perform the SSDT hooks. 
SSDT is "write-protected in Windows XP and later version of Windows" and that the "write protect 
(WP) bit in the CR0 control register" [7]. Thus, in order to perform the SSDT hooking, some rootkits 
modify the protection of the SSDT as a first step of attacking the SSDT, by clearing specific bits of the 
control CR0 register [8][4].  In [3], the authors illustrate two techniques for disabling SSDT write 
protection, and also note that "to subvert the write protection on the SSDT, we need to temporarily 
clear the WP flag" [3].  Rootkits usually use the function NtDeleteValueKey to change the value of a 
registry key, in order to modify the SSDT's protection. Rootkit developers use several SSDT hooking 
methods in order to compromise processes and system files, or to modify records in the SSDT, causing 
it to point to the rootkit itself [3][13][4]. 
Volatility is a powerful framework that can be used to investigate SSDT hooks. Volatility uses 
thrdscan to scan ETHREAD objects and thus to detect when rootkits make copies of the existing 
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SSDTs and assign them to a particular thread such as ETHREAD.Tcb [24]. Volatility also uses the 
ssdt_ex plugin and the HookedSSDT tags to determine which SSDT functions are hooked [13][24][1]. 
In this research paper we systematically investigate the way in which representative anti-virus 
software and kernel rootkits interact with the SSDT, and with each other in terms of the SSDT. Our 
experimentation was conducted in four stages.  In the first stage, we explored SSDT hooking by anti-
virus products, independently of any SSDT hooking by the rootkits.  Then we studied rootkits 
independently of anti-virus products. Next, we investigated the effects of SSDT hooking rootkits in an 
antivirus protected environment. Finally, we investigated machines that had been infected with a 
rootkit which an anti-virus product was attempting to clean. Our results show that there is a broad 
range in the effectiveness of anti-virus products in their ability to protect against a rootkit's strategic 
SSDT hooking techniques, and that a deep and current understanding of that strategy is essential to 
anti-virus development. 
In the next section we review related research. In the third section, we describe our experimental 
methodology and results. Section 4 contains our analysis of those results, and based on this, our 
recommendations. Section 5 is our conclusion. 
2.  REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH 
In 2010, the Matousec.com team conducted a study to determine whether and how anti-virus products 
can be evaded. They tested 35 anti-virus products, and found that every anti-virus product in that 
sample which implements SSDT hooks was vulnerable, including big names such as Kaspersky 
Internet Security and Norton Internet Security [15]. Even subsequent to disclosure [16], Matousec.com 
found that only some of the anti-virus software developers had fixed their vulnerabilities. They 
developed what they call the Kernel Hook Bypassing Engine (KHOBE) attack, which allows the 
malicious codes to bypass the anti-virus's protection mechanisms [15]. KHOBE has two components 
the 'attacker' which attempts to invoke the system service; and a 'faker thread' which attempts to 
modify the parameters such as CLIENT_ID. If the modification occurs after the security check by the 
anti-virus and before the original service gets invoked, the attacker will invoke the service, and the 
bypass attack will be successful [15]. The Matousec.com research illustrated a combined attack where 
KHOBE uses three components attacker and two faker threads, in this case the attacker needs a 
scheduler to switch between the faker threads [15].  
Matousec.com did not investigate SSDT hooking methods from a forensics perspective, nor did they 
study computer memory in order to verify their claim and provide evidences. While Matousec.com 
implemented an attack to demonstrate their claims about the vulnerabilities of SSDT hooking by anti-
virus products, Corregedor and Solms implemented two rootkits that "could collectively disable 
antimalware programs" [4]. The first rootkit was designed to sabotage a Windows OS, and the second 
to disable antimalware programs. The paper discusses SSDT hooking with a focus on the rootkit's 
effect on the KeServiceDescriptorTable. However, there are four System Service Dispatch Tables, and 
other rootkits have different techniques; for example, the rootkit Blackenergy sometimes uses more 
than one table [2][10]. Furthermore, the authors (Corregedor and Solms) stated that there are "no other 
papers that [specifically explore] how rootkits are implemented", and they requested further efforts 
investigating additional malware to gain greater knowledge of how rootkits work [4]. Similarly to 
Matousec.com's research, Corregedor and Solms also demonstrated that SSDT hooking by anti-virus 
products is vulnerable to manipulation by rootkits. Whereas Matousec.com conducted an attack to 
verify this, Corregedor and Solms demonstrated the steps required to implement these two rootkits.  In 
both cases, a forensics investigation analyzing the environment of the attack was not conducted. 
Hsu et al. developed a rootkit that they called "antivirus terminator" [9]. They proposed a mechanism, 
called ANtivirus Software Shield (ANSS), to prevent anti-virus software from being terminated. They 
tested their developed rootkit on five anti-virus products, with the result that it successfully terminated 
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all five. They tested the same five with their anti-virus protection mechanism (ANSS) installed, with 
the result that ANSS in each case protected the anti-virus software from termination. The operative 
component of the ANSS is its filter, which has many rules, such as the rule that any invocation of 
SSDT functions should be through the ANSS. In addition, the ANSS filter prohibits applications from 
using the function NtTerminateProcess to terminate the anti-virus software, and also prohibits any 
modification or deleting of registry keys via functions like NtDeleteKey, NtSetValueKey, and 
NtCreateKey. This work is similar to Matousec.com's research in that both showed that antivirus 
products are vulnerable when they hook the SSDT. It is also similar to that of Corregedor and Solms 
in that they developed rootkits. Again, a forensics approach was not conducted to collect evidence 
from memory. 
Arnold [2] conducted a comparative analysis of rootkit detection techniques against several rootkits. 
Unlike the aforementioned studies, Arnold did conduct a forensics analysis.  He used a hybrid 
approach, which included viewing the processor's utilization on the infected system and comparing it 
to a clean system, and analyzing the output of network-based detection tools (e.g., netstat and nmap) 
for both the infected and clean systems. In addition, Arnold examined the system files' locations and 
registry modifications of the infected system. Arnold's approach did not provide significant evidence 
about the functions of the SSDT that were hooked. Rather, it provided indirect indicators and 
warnings, such as the processor utilization, and presented statistics concerning captured network 
packets. While Arnold investigated the CPU and the network, we investigate the memory, as that is 
where the most direct evidence of an SSDT attack is located. 
Alzaidi et al. [1] extracted digital evidence from volatile memory. They performed their work in a 
virtualized environment, and they compared two forensic techniques, live response and memory image 
analysis, by examining the detection capabilities of two forensic utilities, Redline and Volatility, 
"when the SSDT has been hooked by a rootkit". They showed "that the limitations of this live response 
utility [Redline] are due to the fact that it relies on system calls for detection of SSDT hooks". When 
Alzaidi et al. used Volatility, it was much more effective, and even detected that the live response 
utility Redline was infected by Blackenergy's hook. They did not discuss the hooking and release of 
SSDT functions by anti-virus software, and they called for additional efforts to be made in analyzing 
SSDT "function hooking by antivirus software in cases where rootkits are also in place" [1]. 
Our research has pursued an approach similar to [1], in that we investigate digital evidence extracted 
from volatile memory using the Volatility framework as a memory image forensics tool. The 
following section provides an introduction to the SSDT's structure and the SSDT hooking methods 
used by anti-virus and rootkit software. 
3.  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
We employed well-known anti-virus products [19] and a set of publicly available rootkits that target 
the SSDT. The rootkit samples were collected from many forums, such as KernelMode.info [20] and 
Offensive Computing [18]. Our experimentation was conducted in four stages; each stage involved a 
number of individual experiments using virtual machines, where some of these machines were acting 
as cases and one virtual machine as the control. The purpose of the control machine was for 
comparison: it was our 'clean' machine, and allowed us to easily identify the SSDT hooks arising as a 
result of rootkit and anti-virus installation and interaction. Windows XPSP3 was installed on all 
machines (cases and control) in each stage. The host machine was running Window 7, was equipped 
with an Intel i7 Core, 2.20 GHz CPU, and 16 GB RAM.  A 1.5 TB external drive was used to store the 
memory images.  In each stage memory images were taken from VMware workstation 9.0 machines, 
and memory analysis was performed on the control machine.  
We selected five anti-virus products (AVG, Kaspersky, McAfee, Avast, Trend Micro) and three 
rootkits (Blackenergy, Haxdoor, Papras). For Stage 1, we analyzed the SSDT hooking methods of the 
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selected anti-virus products. For Stage 2, we analyzed the SSDT hooking methods of the selected 
rootkits. Stage 3 studied the interactions between the anti-virus products and rootkits, when the former 
were first installed, and then the latter. Finally, in Stage 4, we did the converse of Stage 3: the rootkits 
were first installed, and then the anti-virus products. Let us now look at the experimental results in 
detail. 
First stage: The primary goal of this stage was to analyze the selected anti-virus' SSDT hooking 
methods.  In our first experiment we installed AVG Anti-virus, and discovered that it hooked the 
function NtOpenProcess which “opens a handle to a process and sets the access rights” [17]. AVG 
terminated threads by calling NtTerminateThread, and NtWriteVirtualMemory was called in order to 
prevent any unauthorized write to or overwrite of virtual memory [22]. We also noted that AVG 
hooked certain functions related to keyboard inputs, such NtUserGetKeyState and 
NtUserGetAsyncKeyState.  Such functions can help an anti-virus product to prevent malicious code 
from reading keyboard related information located in memory or the keyboard buffer [32].  Table 1 in 
Appendix A shows more fully the SSDT hooks by AVG. 
In the second experiment we found that Kaspersky hooked a huge number of functions, but in this 
paper we focus our attention only on those functions related to the operation of the selected rootkits.  
Kaspersky hooked functions more critical than AVG, apparently in order to prevent registry 
manipulation using function calls such as NtRestoreKey, NtDeleteValueKey, and NtDeleteKey. In 
addition, Kaspersky hooked functions like NtAdjustPrivilegesToken, in order to enable or disable the 
access privileges to a specified token that contains information for a logon session [17]. In addition to 
hooking those functions related to registry manipulation, Kaspersky also hooked NtClose to prevent 
malicious attempts to close handles to critical objects such as processes, e.g., an installation process, or 
even to shut down the system. Table 2 in Appendix A shows more fully the SSDT hooks by 
Kaspersky.   
McAfee Anti-virus was the subject of our third experiment. Volatility was unable to detect any SSDT 
hooking by McAfee. We concluded that McAfee did not at all hook the SSDT. 
In the fourth experiment during this stage, Avast was also found to be hooking many critical functions, 
such as the NtDeleteValueKey. In addition, it created a key using the function NtCreateKey, and then 
hooked the function NtDeleteValueKey, in order to prevent any modification to that registry key. 
Avast in fact hooks more functions related to registry keys than the other anti-virus products. 
In our fifth and last experiment during this stage we tested TrendMicro. The SSDT hooking method 
found here was similar to Avast’s: many critical functions were hooked by TrendMicro. With 
TrendMicro, all hooks point to a hidden driver, and any call of these functions is routed through that 
hidden driver. 
Second stage: The primary goal of this stage was to analyze the SSDT hooking methods of rootkits, in 
order to prepare to investigate the interaction between those rootkits and the anti-virus products in the 
third and the fourth stages of our experimentation. The focus at this stage was on rootkits that employ 
SSDT hooking as part of their exploitation techniques.  
Our first experiment at this stage was to launch the rootkit Blackenergy in a new virtual machine. We 
found that Blackenergy hooks the SSDT. Blackenergy starts the SSDT hooking process with the 
function NtDeleteValueKey; this function is typically used by rootkits to modify or add values in a 
specified registry key. Blackenergy hooked this function in order to break the protection of the SSDT.  
Blackenergy also hooked functions like NtOpenKey and NtSetValueKey in order to gain write 
permission to the registry [3].  NtTerminateThread was hooked, the purpose of which might be for 
thread injection [5], and the NtWriteVirtualMemory function was also hooked, to write to or overwrite 
virtual memory, in order to address injected code [22]. This SSDT hooking method by Blackenergy 
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allows it to avoid detection and deletion.  In fact, Blackenergy attempts to hide its driver, as shown in 
Figure 1 below. 
. 
Figure 1 Blackenergy is pointing SSDT function to a hidden driver 
The rootkit Haxdoor hooks fewer functions; notably, it hooks NtOpenKey in order to manipulate a 
registry key [17].  There are many versions of this rootkit available in public; some of these samples 
just use the NtCreateProcess function to create a new process [14]. We selected a Haxdoor version 
that hooks more functions, as shown in Appendix B Figure 2. Its also notable is the fact that, while 
Blackenergy was able to hide its driver, this was not so with Haxdoor, as shown in Figure 2 below. 
.  
Figure 2 Haxdoor is pointing SSDT function to the driver vbagz.sys 
We used the rootkit Papras in our last experiment of this stage, and we found Papras was hooking the 
functions NtQueryDirectoryFile and NtQuerySystemInformation in order to retrieve information from 
a specific file.  Papras can therefore be used to retrieve the credential information, e.g. an online 
banking login id that may be stored in a buffer [23].  Papras does something similar to Blackenergy in 
terms of hiding its driver, as shown in Figure 3 below.  
.  
Figure 3 Papras is pointing SSDT function to a hidden driver 
Third stage: During this stage our goal was to observe and analyze the interactions between rootkits 
and anti-virus products. Here we studied the effect of SSDT hooking by rootkits operating in an 
antivirus protected environment. The anti-virus products were installed first, and the rootkits were 
launched subsequently. We examined the SSDT functions hooked either by the selected anti-virus 
products (as discovered in the first stage of our experimentation) or by the rootkits (as discovered in 
the second stage), in order to observe how the anti-virus products and rootkits interact as defender and 
attacker within the system.  
We began with AVG and Blackenergy. We observed AVG requesting notification about registry key 
changes using the functions NtNotifyChangeKey and NtNotifyChangeMultipleKeys. Notification was 
positive and the registry key was changed and the SSDT compromised. The reaction by AVG was to 
hook the same functions back. For example, the function NtOpenProcess was reclaimed by AVG.  
Unfortunately, Blackenergy was able to return the favour, and change the registry key again; it then 
hooked NtDeleteValueKey. The reaction by AVG this time was different: AVG used the 
NtUserGetAsyncKeyState in order to return the status of all keys at a given moment. Figure 2 in 
Appendix C shows the reaction of AVG in order to prevent the SSDT attack by Blackenergy. 
This kind of reaction by AVG is limited in its effectiveness, as the rootkit will continue deleting the 
values of the keys in the registry using the function NtDeleteValueKey; it seems that AVG might avoid 
this vulnerability by hooking or disabling the function NtDeleteValueKey. However, many processes 
were belonging to AVG were infected, carrying out the rootkit's functions. Blackenergy was able to 
camouflage itself as vmtoolsd.exe, and also took control of the process avgwdsvc.exe, the AVG 
Watchdog Service. AVG’s SSDT hooking method, therefore, was ineffective at protecting the 
system’s processes or even its own processes.  Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix C show the infected 
processes. 
We executed the same experiment with Kaspersky and Blackenergy. As we know from the first stage, 
Kaspersky hooks critical functions in order to prevent registry manipulation, such as manipulation of 
NtDeleteValueKey. We found that Blackenergy was unable to hook any SSDT function, because, as 
we knew from our previous experiments in the second stage, Blackenergy relies on 
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NtDeleteValueKey, and this function and other critical functions were already hooked by Kaspersky. 
In general, we found Kaspersky was able to protect all processes, including its own processes, such as 
avp.exe. See Figure 5, Appendix C. 
Our third experiment at this stage employed McAfee and Blackenergy. As we know from the first 
stage, McAfee does not use SSDT hooking.  After installing Blackenergy, McAfee reported that it had 
detected and was able to remove the rootkit, yet this appeared to be only partly true, since McAfee 
continued to report this even after it had apparently attempted to remove the rootkit. We investigated 
this further from a process perspective. We found to be infected the process Mcagent.exe, which is a 
process belonging McAfee, designed to ensure that its virus definitions are up to date. Further, 
Blackenergy was able to infect other processes that belong to McAfee, such as the Mcshield.exe, 
which is McAfee’s process to monitor computer processes, files and the registry, in order to detect and 
prevent virus infection.  Similarly, McSvHost.exe, known as McAfee Service Host, became infected, 
as was Mcpvtray.exe, McAfee’s AntiTheft process. Finally, MOBKbackup.exe, the McAfee Online 
Backup Service, was also infected. Figures 7-11 in Appendix C show these infected processes. 
Avast and Trend Micro were able to protect the SSDT and prevent these Blackenergy attacks, due to 
the fact that, like Kaspersky, Avast and Trend Micro hooked many critical functions, such as 
NtDeleteValueKey. Since the findings were similar to that of Kaspersky, we do not show the details in 
this paper. 
The five selected Anti-virus products were able to protect against the other two rootkits, Haxdoor and 
Papras. Volatility didn't show any SSDT hooking by Haxdoor or Papras when any of the selected anti-
virus products were installed. For example, this sample of Volatility output is from a machine where 
Haxdoor and MacAfee were both in place. The SSDT tables are not occupied, because MacAfee is not 
using the SSDT, and yet Haxdoor was still unable to function while the anti-virus software was 
running. 
Created: 2012-12-13 00:34:30 
Exited: 2012-12-13 00:49:37 
Owning Process: 0x81caf928 '' 
Attached Process: 0x81caf928 '' 
State: Terminated 
BasePriority: 0x8 
Priority: 0x10 
TEB: 0x00000000 
StartAddress: 0x7c8106e9  
ServiceTable: 0x80552f60 
 [0] 0x80501b8c 
 [1] 0xbf999b80 
 [2] - 
 [3] - 
Fourth stage: The purpose of this stage was, like the previous stage, to observe and analyze the 
interactions between rootkits and anti-virus products. We investigated machines that had been first 
infected with a rootkit, which we then attempted to clean with an anti-virus product. 
We began by launching Blackenergy and then installing AVG. However, the installation process did 
not complete and the system began an automatic shutdown. Our analysis of the memory image 
revealed that Blackenergy was calling the function NtShutdownSystem; this explains why the system 
was closing down (see Figure 1, Appendix D). We explored further, from a process perspective, 
concentrating on setup.exe and explorer.exe. We found that AVG was unable to execute setup.exe and 
that it was not running, and we further found that explorer.exe was infected by Blackenergy. Figures 2 
and 3 of Appendix D show the details. 
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Interactions between Kaspersky and Blackenergy were similar, but slightly different from the 
foregoing.   Kaspersky does not hook the function NtShutdownSystem, and consequently the same 
thing happened here as with AVG: the system shut down, and Blackenergy didn’t allow Kaspersky to 
be installed. Our analysis of the memory image produced unexpected findings: Kaspersky was not 
successfully installed, but attempted regardless to hook the SSDT, presumably during the installation 
process. Blackenergy, however, already had control over the Native SSDT functions 
(KeServiceDescriptorTable), and maintained that control, while Kaspersky took control of the GUI 
SSDT functions (KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow). For details, see Figures 4 and 5 in Appendix D. 
TrendMicro was similar to the foregoing: Blackenergy called NtShutdownSystem to thwart installation 
of the anti-virus.  Avast was quite different, however: Avast indeed hooked NtShutdownSystem, so that 
Blackenergy could not shut down the system, but in addition hooked various functions in order to 
ensure the completion of its installation without disruption.  For example, Avast hooked 
NtSetBootOptions, NtModifyBootEntry, and NtAddBootEntry. See Figure 6 in Appendix D. 
Finally, we note here in passing that all five selected anti-virus products were able to clean the other 
two rootkits, Haxdoor and Papras. We omit the details from this paper. 
4.  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We investigated rootkits that target the SSDT, and we found that these rootkits usually use more than 
one strategy to conceal an attack. For example, Blackenergy manipulated the registry in order to break 
the protection of the SSDT, and used the function NtDeleteValueKey to change the value of registry 
keys, in order to modify the SSDT’s protection. In our fourth stage we observed Blackenergy closing 
down the system in order to stop the installation process of the anti-virus product. Haxdoor and Papras 
employed SSDT hooking in order to steal sensitive information, using the functions 
NtQueryDirectoryFile and NtQuerySystemInformation. Some Anti-virus products employ the SSDT 
hooking to set restrictions on accessing a system’s resources. For example, some will hook the SSDT 
to scan any new launched program [6][7][21].  
Anti-virus products like Kaspersky, Avast and TrendMicro protect registry keys by hooking the 
function NtDeleteValueKey, which can be effective in preventing manipulation of registry keys to 
break SSDT protection. Avast and TrendMicro created their own key using the function 
NTCreateKey, and then protected the created key and its value using the functions NtDeleteKey and 
NtDeleteValueKey. This may be effective in preventing attacks against the unused SSDT tables, and 
makes it difficult for rootkits to modify the protection of the SSDT by clearing a specific bit of the 
processor's CR0 register [3][4]. Instead of using this well-known value, Avast and TrendMicro create 
a new key with a new value. 
Generally, hooking critical SSDT functions is essential for Anti-virus products. In our experiments we 
found that the SSDT hooking decisions by Kaspersky, Avast, and TrendMicro were most effective in 
terms of protecting the SSDT. On the other hand, AVG missed many critical functions, and SSDT 
hooking was not used at all by McAfee. Since what constitutes a critical function depends to a great 
degree on malware design, we emphasize that SSDT hooking by anti-virus products should be based 
on a precise understanding of current rootkit design. It is noteworthy that a recent paper published by 
Anti-virus team members did not show a full understanding of Blackenergy's current design [11]. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We investigated the effectiveness of selected anti-virus products in defending the SSDT against 
malicious hooking, and exhibited the use of forensics tools and techniques for the investigation of 
rootkit attacks in the presence of anti-virus software. We recommend careful attention to rootkit SSDT 
hooking design when developing anti-virus products. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendixes A, B, C, and D provide detail regarding the results of our four stages of experimentation.  
 
 
 
Appendix A Anti-virus SSDT hooking 
 
Table A-1 SSDT functions hooked by AVG 
Function Driver name 
NtOpenProcess AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtTerminateProcess AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtTerminateThread  AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtWriteVirtualMemory AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtUserGetAsyncKeyState AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtUserGetKeyboardState  AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtUserGetKeyState AVGIDSShim.Sys 
NtUserSetWindowsHookEx AVGIDSShim.Sys 
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Table A-2 SSDT functions hooked by Kaspersky 
Function Driver name 
NtAdjustPrivilegesToken klif.sys 
NtClose klif.sys 
NtConnectPort klif.sys 
NtCreateEvent klif.sys 
NtCreateMutant klif.sys 
NtCreatePort klif.sys 
NtCreateProcess klif.sys 
NtCreateProcessEx klif.sys 
NtCreateSection klif.sys 
NtCreateSemaphore klif.sys 
NtCreateThread klif.sys 
NtCreateWaitablePort klif.sys 
NtDebugActiveProcess klif.sys 
NtDeleteKey klif.sys 
NtDeleteValueKey klif.sys 
NtDeviceIoControlFile klif.sys 
NtDuplicateObject klif.sys 
NtEnumerateKey klif.sys 
NtEnumerateValueKey klif.sys 
NtLoadDriver klif.sys 
NtLoadKey klif.sys 
NtLoadKey2 klif.sys 
NtMapViewOfSection klif.sys 
NtNotifyChangeKey klif.sys 
NtOpenEvent klif.sys 
NtOpenMutant klif.sys 
NtOpenProcess klif.sys 
NtOpenSection klif.sys 
NtOpenSemaphore klif.sys 
NtOpenThread klif.sys 
NtQueryKey klif.sys 
NtQueryMultipleValueKey klif.sys 
NtQueryObject klif.sys 
NtQueryValueKey klif.sys 
NtQueueApcThread klif.sys 
NtRenameKey klif.sys 
NtReplaceKey klif.sys 
NtReplyPort klif.sys 
NtReplyWaitReceivePort klif.sys 
NtReplyWaitReceivePortEx klif.sys 
NtRequestWaitReplyPort klif.sys 
NtRestoreKey klif.sys 
NtResumeThread klif.sys 
NtSaveKey klif.sys 
NtSaveKeyEx klif.sys 
NtSaveMergedKeys klif.sys 
NtSecureConnectPort klif.sys 
NtSetContextThread klif.sys 
NtSetInformationToken klif.sys 
NtSetSystemInformation klif.sys 
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Table A-3 SSDT functions hooked by Avast 
Function Driver name 
NtAllocateVirtualMemory  aswSP.SYS 
NtClose  aswSP.SYS 
NtCreateKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtCreateSection  aswSP.SYS 
NtDeleteKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtDeleteValueKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtDuplicateObject  aswSP.SYS 
NtFreeVirtualMemory  aswSP.SYS 
NtLoadDriver  aswSP.SYS 
NtOpenKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtOpenProcess  aswSP.SYS 
NtOpenThread  aswSP.SYS 
NtProtectVirtualMemory  aswSP.SYS 
NtQueryValueKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtRenameKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtRestoreKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtSetValueKey  aswSP.SYS 
NtTerminateProcess  aswSP.SYS 
NtUnloadDriver  aswSP.SYS 
NtWriteVirtualMemory  aswSP.SYS 
 
Table A-4 SSDT functions hooked by TrendMicro 
Function Driver name 
NtCreateKey Hidden 
NtCreateMutant  Hidden 
NtCreateProcess  Hidden 
NtCreateProcessEx  Hidden 
NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject  Hidden 
NtCreateThread  Hidden 
NtDeleteKey  Hidden 
NtDeleteValueKey  Hidden 
NtDuplicateObject  Hidden 
NtLoadDriver  Hidden 
NtOpenProcess  Hidden 
NtOpenSection  Hidden 
NtOpenThread  Hidden 
NtRenameKey  Hidden 
NtRestoreKey  Hidden 
NtSetSystemInformation  Hidden 
NtSetValueKey  Hidden 
NtTerminateProcess  Hidden 
NtTerminateThread  Hidden 
NtWriteVirtualMemory  Hidden 
NtUserSetWindowsHookAW  Hidden 
NtUserSetWindowsHookEx  Hidden 
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Appendix B Rootkit SSDT hooking 
 
Figure B-1 SSDT functions hooked by Blackenergy 
 
Figure B-2 SSDT functions hooked by Haxdoor 
 
Figure B-3 SSDT functions hooked by Papras 
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Appendix C SSDT hooking interaction when anti-virus is installed before rootkit 
 
Figure C-1 SSDT hooking with AVG and Blackenergy 
 
Figure C-2 AVG's vmtoolsd.exe infected 
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Figure C-3 AVG's avgwdsvc.exe infected 
 
 
Figure C-4 Kaspersky protects its avp.exe process from Blackenergy 
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Figure C-5 Kaspersky protects its Datamn~1.exe process from Blackenergy 
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Figure C-6 MacAfee's mcagent.exe process infected  by Blackenergy 
 
Figure C-7 MacAfee's mcshield.exe process infected by Blackenergy 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2013 
 
154 
 
Figure C-8 McAfee's McSvHost.exe process infected by Blackenergy 
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Figure C-9 MacAfee's McPvTray.exe process infected by Blackenergy 
 
Figure C-10 MacAfee's MOBKbackup.exe process infected by Blackenergy 
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Appendix D SSDT hooking interaction when rootkit is installed before anti-virus 
Entry 0x0041: 0x823ba1a1 (NtDeleteValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0047: 0x823b9e39 (NtEnumerateKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0049: 0x823b9f52 (NtEnumerateValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0077: 0x823b9d6f (NtOpenKey) owned by 
Entry 0x007a: 0x823b9aa9 (NtOpenProcess) owned by 
Entry 0x0080: 0x823b9b31 (NtOpenThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0089: 0x823ba3e6 (NtProtectVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x0091: 0x823ba5bd (NtQueryDirectoryFile) owned by 
Entry 0x00ad: 0x823b9956 (NtQuerySystemInformation) owned by 
Entry 0x00ba: 0x823ba2fa (NtReadVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x00d5: 0x823b9cfc (NtSetContextThread) owned by 
Entry 0x00f7: 0x823ba08f (NtSetValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x00f9: 0x823b7ca8 (NtShutdownSystem) owned by 
Entry 0x00fe: 0x823b9c89 (NtSuspendThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0102: 0x823b9c16 (NtTerminateThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0115: 0x823ba370 (NtWriteVirtualMemory) owned by 
Figure D-1 Blackenergy using NtShutdownSystem 
 
State: Waiting:UserRequest 
BasePriority: 0xd 
Priority: 0xf 
TEB: 0x7ffdf000 
StartAddress: 0x7c8106f5 
ServiceTable: 0x824543a8 
[0] 0x8248f898 
[0x41] NtDeleteValueKey 0x823ba1a1 
[0x47] NtEnumerateKey 0x823b9e39 
[0x49] NtEnumerateValueKey 0x823b9f52 
[0x77] NtOpenKey 0x823b9d6f 
[0x7a] NtOpenProcess 0x823b9aa9 
[0x80] NtOpenThread 0x823b9b31 
[0x89] NtProtectVirtualMemory 0x823ba3e6 
[0x91] NtQueryDirectoryFile 0x823ba5bd 
[0xad] NtQuerySystemInformation 0x823b9956 
[0xba] NtReadVirtualMemory 0x823ba2fa 
[0xd5] NtSetContextThread 0x823b9cfc 
[0xf7] NtSetValueKey 0x823ba08f 
[0xf9] NtShutdownSystem 0x823b7ca8 
[0xfe] NtSuspendThread 0x823b9c89 
[0x102] NtTerminateThread 0x823b9c16 
[0x115] NtWriteVirtualMemory 0x823ba370 
[1] 0xbf999b80 
[2] - 
[3] - 
 
Figure D-2 The process explore.exe infected by Blackenergy 
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Owning Process: 0x82068d60 'setup.exe' 
Attached Process: 0x82068d60 'setup.exe' 
State: Waiting:UserRequest 
BasePriority: 0x8 
Priority: 0x8 
TEB: 0x7ffa8000 
StartAddress: 0x7c8106e9 
ServiceTable: 0x8201fef0 
[0] 0x82012328 
[0x41] NtDeleteValueKey 0x823121a1 
[0x47] NtEnumerateKey 0x82311e39 
[0x49] NtEnumerateValueKey 0x82311f52 
[0x77] NtOpenKey 0x82311d6f 
[0x7a] NtOpenProcess 0x82311aa9 
[0x80] NtOpenThread 0x82311b31 
[0x89] NtProtectVirtualMemory 0x823123e6 
[0x91] NtQueryDirectoryFile 0x823125bd 
[0xba] NtReadVirtualMemory 0x823122fa 
[0xd5] NtSetContextThread 0x82311cfc 
[0xf7] NtSetValueKey 0x8231208f 
[0xfe] NtSuspendThread 0x82311c89 
[0x102] NtTerminateThread 0x82311c16 
[0x115] NtWriteVirtualMemory 0x82312370 
[1] - 
[2] - 
[3] - 
 
Figure D-3 The process setup.exe compromised by Blackenergy 
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Entry 0x0041: 0x823121a1 (NtDeleteValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0047: 0x82311e39 (NtEnumerateKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0049: 0x82311f52 (NtEnumerateValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0077: 0x82311d6f (NtOpenKey) owned by 
Entry 0x007a: 0x82311aa9 (NtOpenProcess) owned by 
Entry 0x0080: 0x82311b31 (NtOpenThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0089: 0x823123e6 (NtProtectVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x0091: 0x823125bd (NtQueryDirectoryFile) owned by 
Entry 0x00ba: 0x823122fa (NtReadVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x00d5: 0x82311cfc (NtSetContextThread) owned by 
Entry 0x00f7: 0x8231208f (NtSetValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x00fe: 0x82311c89 (NtSuspendThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0102: 0x82311c16 (NtTerminateThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0115: 0x82312370 (NtWriteVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x0041: 0x823121a1 (NtDeleteValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0047: 0x82311e39 (NtEnumerateKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0049: 0x82311f52 (NtEnumerateValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x0077: 0x82311d6f (NtOpenKey) owned by 
Entry 0x007a: 0x82311aa9 (NtOpenProcess) owned by 
Entry 0x0080: 0x82311b31 (NtOpenThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0089: 0x823123e6 (NtProtectVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x0091: 0x823125bd (NtQueryDirectoryFile) owned by 
Entry 0x00ba: 0x823122fa (NtReadVirtualMemory) owned by 
Entry 0x00d5: 0x82311cfc (NtSetContextThread) owned by 
Entry 0x00f7: 0x8231208f (NtSetValueKey) owned by 
Entry 0x00fe: 0x82311c89 (NtSuspendThread) owned by 
Entry 0x0102: 0x82311c16 (NtTerminateThread) owned by 
Entry 0x1007: 0xb1d4aec8 (NtGdiAlphaBlend) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x100d: 0xb1d4a640 (NtGdiBitBlt) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x10bf: 0xb1d4ae82 (NtGdiGetPixel) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x10e3: 0xb1d4a716 (NtGdiMaskBlt) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x10ed: 0xb1d4a786 (NtGdiPlgBlt) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1124: 0xb1d4a6aa (NtGdiStretchBlt) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x112a: 0xb1d4b016 (NtGdiTransparentBlt) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1133: 0xb1d4abbe (NtUserAttachThreadInput) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1143: 0xb1d4a60c (NtUserCallOneParam) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x117a: 0xb1d4a374 (NtUserFindWindowEx) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x117f: 0xb1d4a168 (NtUserGetAsyncKeyState) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x119e: 0xb1d4a56a (NtUserGetKeyboardState) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11a0: 0xb1d4a1b8 (NtUserGetKeyState) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11cc: 0xb1d4a2bc (NtUserMessageCall) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11db: 0xb1d4a208 (NtUserPostMessage) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11dc: 0xb1d4a260 (NtUserPostThreadMessage) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11ea: 0xb1d4ac78 (NtUserRegisterHotKey) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11eb: 0xb1d4a4ea (NtUserRegisterRawInputDevices) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x11f6: 0xb1d4a320 (NtUserSendInput) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1211: 0xb1d4aa4a (NtUserSetParent) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1220: 0xb1d49fbe (NtUserSetWindowLong) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1225: 0xb1d4a018 (NtUserSetWindowsHookEx) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1228: 0xb1d4a0c0 (NtUserSetWinEventHook) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1240: 0xb1d4ad90 (NtUserUnregisterHotKey) owned by klif.sys 
Entry 0x1250: 0xb1d4a474 (NtUserWindowFromPoint) owned by klif.sys 
Figure D-4 Kaspersky installation unsuccessful, but trying to hook the SSDT
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Owning Process: 0x81f6a020 'explorer.exe' 
Attached Process: 0x81f6a020 'explorer.exe' 
State: Waiting:UserRequest 
BasePriority: 0x8 
Priority: 0x9 
TEB: 0x7ffd4000 
StartAddress: 0x7c8106e9  
ServiceTable: 0x82321188 
  [0] 0x81f676a8 
      [0x41] NtDeleteValueKey 0x823121a1  
      [0x47] NtEnumerateKey 0x82311e39  
      [0x49] NtEnumerateValueKey 0x82311f52  
      [0x77] NtOpenKey 0x82311d6f  
      [0x7a] NtOpenProcess 0x82311aa9  
      [0x80] NtOpenThread 0x82311b31  
      [0x89] NtProtectVirtualMemory 0x823123e6  
      [0x91] NtQueryDirectoryFile 0x823125bd  
      [0xba] NtReadVirtualMemory 0x823122fa  
      [0xd5] NtSetContextThread 0x82311cfc  
      [0xf7] NtSetValueKey 0x8231208f  
      [0xfe] NtSuspendThread 0x82311c89  
      [0x102] NtTerminateThread 0x82311c16  
      [0x115] NtWriteVirtualMemory 0x82312370  
  [1] 0xbf999b80 
      [0x7] NtGdiAlphaBlend 0xb1d4aec8 klif.sys 
      [0xd] NtGdiBitBlt 0xb1d4a640 klif.sys 
      [0xbf] NtGdiGetPixel 0xb1d4ae82 klif.sys 
      [0xe3] NtGdiMaskBlt 0xb1d4a716 klif.sys 
      [0xed] NtGdiPlgBlt 0xb1d4a786 klif.sys 
      [0x124] NtGdiStretchBlt 0xb1d4a6aa klif.sys 
      [0x12a] NtGdiTransparentBlt 0xb1d4b016 klif.sys 
      [0x133] NtUserAttachThreadInput 0xb1d4abbe klif.sys 
      [0x143] NtUserCallOneParam 0xb1d4a60c klif.sys 
      [0x17a] NtUserFindWindowEx 0xb1d4a374 klif.sys 
      [0x17f] NtUserGetAsyncKeyState 0xb1d4a168 klif.sys 
      [0x1a0] NtUserGetKeyState 0xb1d4a1b8 klif.sys 
      [0x1cc] NtUserMessageCall 0xb1d4a2bc klif.sys 
      [0x1db] NtUserPostMessage 0xb1d4a208 klif.sys 
      [0x1dc] NtUserPostThreadMessage 0xb1d4a260 klif.sys 
      [0x1ea] NtUserRegisterHotKey 0xb1d4ac78 klif.sys 
      [0x1eb] NtUserRegisterRawInputDevices 0xb1d4a4ea klif.sys 
      [0x1f6] NtUserSendInput 0xb1d4a320 klif.sys 
      [0x211] NtUserSetParent 0xb1d4aa4a klif.sys 
      [0x220] NtUserSetWindowLong 0xb1d49fbe klif.sys 
      [0x225] NtUserSetWindowsHookEx 0xb1d4a018 klif.sys 
      [0x228] NtUserSetWinEventHook 0xb1d4a0c0 klif.sys 
      [0x240] NtUserUnregisterHotKey 0xb1d4ad90 klif.sys 
      [0x250] NtUserWindowFromPoint 0xb1d4a474 klif.sys 
Figure D-5 explorer.exe under control of Blackenergy’s Nativc SSDT functions; Kaspersky taking the 
GUI 
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Figure D-6 Avast using booting functions and NtShutdownSystem 
